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Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Migration:  
An Empirical Analysis in Developing Countries 
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between natural disasters caused by 
climate change and migration by examining migration rates and levels of education in 
developing countries. Many studies such as the Stern review (2007) or the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) predict an intensification of climate change for future 
years. Thus climate change has taken an essential place in world governance. The 
relationship between climate change, natural disasters and migration is crucial; developed 
countries need to manage the increasingly complicated issues of additional incoming 
migratory flows caused by environmental degradation. We investigate this relationship by 
using panel data from developing countries in order to see the effect of natural disasters on 
migration rates and how that varies according to the level of education. Estimations are made 
with a country fixed effects estimator through an accurate econometric model. The results 
confirm previous studies, namely that natural disasters are positively associated with 
emigration rates. But beyond this result, the main contribution of this paper is to show that 
natural disasters due to climate change exacerbate the brain drain in developing countries 
characterized by the migration of highly skilled people just when those countries are at their 
most vulnerable and need greater support from skilled workers to deal with the damage 
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1.  Introduction 
International migration is of great concern to developing countries.  The movement of 
human capital is led by economic, demographic, political, social, cultural and environmental 
factors in both the sending country (push factors) as well as in destination countries (pull 
factors).    The  main  reason  for  international  migration  found  in  the  theoretical  and  the 
empirical  literature  is  differences  in  economic  opportunities  or,  more  precisely,  wages 
differential (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Ghatak et al. 1996).  Beyond the wages differential, 
migration is considered as a way to diversify income sources (Stark, 1991), to deal with bad 
political institutions, large social disparities, conflicts, and the lack of good infrastructure.  
People also migrate for family reunification or to join relatives abroad.  Finally, because of 
globalization,  there  is  a  decreasing  of  the  uncertainty  caused  by  modern  communication 
technologies  such  as  the  internet  and  satellite  TV,  which  might  be  an  explanation  for 
persistently rising migration in recent decades.  In a word, migration is a possibility for people 
to improve their quality of life and all the factors previously named can be affected directly or 
indirectly by climate change and natural disasters.  
History demonstrates that climate change is often associated with massive movements of 
population and that the natural environment is probably the oldest determinant of migration 
and  population  displacement.    Many  studies  such  as  the  Stern  report  (2007)  and  the 
Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC,  2007)  predict  an  intensification  of 
climate change for the forthcoming years.  According to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), by the half century, 200 million people (equal to the current estimate of 
international migrants) could be permanent or temporary environmental migrants
2 within their 
countries  or  overseas.    Climate  change  has,  thus,  taken  an  important  place  in  world 
governance.  But the partial failure of the Copenhagen Conference (2009) shows that it is 
difficult for the states to agree on the strategy to adopt in order to reduce their impact on the 
environment.  The interests and the means of action are different according to each nation’s 
level of development.  Indeed, developed countries are responsible for an important part
3 of 
pollution and greenhouse gas emission compared to developing countries, which bear the 
brunt of this environmental degradation and are disproportionately affected because of their 
                                                           
2 We consider the term “environmental migrants”, because it is larger and inclusive than environmental refugees. It takes into 
account the forced population displacement due to environmental reasons; with push factors largely more determinant then 
pull factors (see Appendix 1 for other definitions). 
3 Rich countries will be responsible for 60-80% of gas emission by 2050 (Stern, 2007) 3 
 
economic vulnerability and their lack of means due to poverty.  This environmental decline 
can induce natural disasters among other problems and, for the population of those countries, 
migration is one of the solutions to confront this issue.  The management of supplementary 
migratory flows due to environmental degradation are made more complicated for developed 
countries by issues of migration from developing countries.  Environmental migration is often 
at the origin of population displacement which can affect the stability of the hosting areas in 
many ways.  It can induce conflicts with local populations by putting pressure on employment 
and local wages, trade and natural resources such as water, especially if those regions are 
already poor.  
Since the second half of the eighties, many studies have been conducted on the effect of 
climate change on involuntary population displacement.  In recent decades, Reuveny (2007) 
argues that the effects  of climate  change on migration  can be predicted by  exploring the 
effects of environmental problems on migration.  People can adapt to these problems by either 
staying  in  place  and  doing  nothing,  staying  in  place  and  mitigating  the  problems,  or  by 
leaving  the  affected  areas,  depending  on  the  extent  of  problems  and  the  mitigation 
capabilities.  According to Smith (2007) migration on a permanent or temporary basis has 
always been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people confronted by 
natural or human-caused disasters.  Naudé (2008) shows in the Sub-Saharan Africa context 
that  environmental  pressure  has  an  impact  on  migration  through  the  frequency  of  natural 
disasters.    Poston  et  al  (2009)  show  the  effect  of  climate  change  on  in-migration,  out-
migration and net migration among 50 states of the United States of America and their results 
are confirmed by Reuveny and Moore (2009) who demonstrate that environmental decline 
plays a statistically significant role in out-migration, pushing people to leave their homes and 
move to other countries.  Finally, Marchiori and Schumacher (2011) found that minor impacts 
of climate change have major impacts on the numbers of migrants. 
Relative to this literature, the main contribution and the aim of this paper is to examine the 
relationship between climate change and migration by studying the effect on migration rates 
of  natural  disasters  caused  by  climate  change  but  above  all,  and  different  from  previous 
studies, by examining the effect of natural disasters on migration in the context of the level of 
people’s education. 
The  paper  then  investigates  the  relationship  between  climate  change,  migration  and 
natural disasters by using panel data from developing countries.  Estimationss are made with a 4 
 
country fixed effects estimator through an accurate econometric model and the results confirm 
previous studies, namely that natural disasters are positively associated with emigration rates.  
But, beyond this, the paper shows that natural disasters due to climate change exacerbate the 
brain drain in developing countries by involving the migration of highly skilled people, and 
this effect varies depending on the geographical location of the countries. 
The next section presents a literature review on the climate change issue in developing 
countries and the relationship between climate change, natural disasters and migration.  In 
Section 3 we present the empirical design while the estimations results and robustness checks 
are discussed in Section 4.  Concluding remarks and implications are provided in the last 
section. 
2.  Literature Review 
The  forecasts  concerning  environmental  issues  due  to  climate  change  are  alarming.  
According to Dyson (2005), there will inevitably be a major rise in atmospheric CO
2 during 
the 21st century due among other causes to the momentum in economic and demographic 
processes.  Stern (2007) warns that, by 2035, a rise in temperature of over 2°C induced by a 
rapid increase of greenhouse gas emissions could be doubled compared with its pre-industrial 
level
4.  In the long term, the temperature rise may exceed 5°C, which is equivalent to the 
change in average temperatures from the last ice age to today.  Marine eco-systems and food 
stocks are threatened by oceanic acidification due to carbon dioxide levels.  Due to global 
warming, the Arctic will be ice-free in summer by 2100 because of a reduction of sea ice, and 
15 to 40% of its species may become extinct.  Melting glaciers will result in a rise in sea 
levels, particularly in the subtropics (Meehl and al., 2006), putting pressure on coastal areas 
and small islands.  It will also threaten 4 million km² of land representing home to 5% of the 
world’s  population,  and  may  increase  flood  risks  during  wet  seasons  and  reduced  water 
supplies to one sixth of the world’s population.  Global warming, by altering the environment, 
has a significant effect on human health and infectious diseases (Schrag and Wiener, 1995; 
Khasnis  and  Nettleman,  2005).    It  entails  natural  disasters  which  affect  housing, 
infrastructure, crop yield and livestock and consequently weakens economies (Perch-Nielsen, 
et al., 2008). 
 
                                                           
4 According to this report, average global temperatures could increase by 2-3°C within the next fifty years. 5 
 
 2.1 Climate change issue in developing countries 
Climate  has  a  significant  effect  on  well-being  and  levels  of  happiness.    Rehdanz  and 
Maddison (2005) show that temperature changes benefit high latitude countries whereas they 
negatively affect low latitude countries.  Indeed, a small amount of global warming would 
increase the happiness of those living in Northern countries, whereas it is the reverse for 
people  living  in  high  temperature  regions.    According  to  Stern  (2007),  predictions  for 
developing countries reveal alarming future agricultural output and a reduction in crop yields, 
food  security  and  issues  related  to  water.    Climate  change  involves  droughts  which  are 
responsible for an increase in food prices, disease, and consequently an increase in health 
expenditure.  Moreover, populations have to deal with the issue of water, the most climate 
sensitive economic resource for these countries.  In South Asia, for example, climate change 
will increase rainfall and flooding with a direct effect on agricultural production, and with 
serious  consequences  in  a  region  with  a  high  population  growth.    In  Latin  America  and 
Caribbean  areas,  serious  threats  exist  to  the  rainforests  with  direct  consequences  for  the 
subsistence of populations depending on the Amazonian forest.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, an 
increase  in  sea  level  threatens  coastal  cities  when  higher  temperatures  raise  risks  of 
malnutrition, starvation and malaria, decreased river flow and the subsequent availability of 
water.  In the Nile Basin, the Middle East and North African countries, water stress and severe 
droughts could cause migration and violent conflicts
5. 
The poorest countries have also to cope with the economic consequences of climate 
change.  Climate change weakens States and decreases their ability to provide opportunities 
and services to help people become less vulnerable, above all if those people already live in 
marginalized areas.  Indeed, the economy of many developing countries is essentially based 
on  agriculture  and  primary  goods  which  are  one  of  the  main  sectors  directly  touched  by 
climate change and natural disasters.  As well as their poverty, developing countries are in a 
disadvantageous situation due to their rapid population growth, their massive urbanization and 
their geographical environment, which make them more vulnerable and less able to adapt to 
climate  change.    It  decreases  GDP  growth,  increases  the  deficit  and  the  external  debt  of 
countries often already weakened economically.  Moreover, their low income levels and their 
underdeveloped financial markets make for unattainable insurances and credits to cover them 
                                                           
5 In SSA, on 80 million people suffering of starvation due to environmental factors, 7 million migrated to obtain food (Myers, 
2005). The increasing in temperature of 2°C involve an increasing in population affected by malaria in Africa of 40-80 
million people (70-80  million people affected with an increasing of 3°C-4°C). By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of 
African people will be exposed to water stress caused by climate change (Stern, 2007). 6 
 
in case of climatic shocks, which increase their vulnerability at individual and national levels.  
Climate change is, then, a constraint to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
goals and to sustainable development in general (Stern, 2007).  Many developing countries 
are  experiencing  an  increase  in  the  frequency  and  costs  of  natural  disasters  which  are 
estimated on average at 5% of their GDP between 1997 and 2001 (IMF, 2003).  In India and 
South East Asia the reduction in GDP due to climate change is estimated at between 9 and 
13% by 2100 compared with a situation without climate change.  The cost of adaptation for 
these countries will be at least between 5% and 10% of GDP and will weigh on government 
budgets, all the more so since less than 1% of losses from natural disasters were insured in 
low-income countries from 1985 to 1999.  The frequency of climate events does not give time 
to  rebuild  or  reconstitute  their  patrimony,  keeping  them  in  a  poverty  trap.    There  is  a 
crowding-out effect because the poorest are obliged to reallocate their resources to deal with 
the consequences of climate change instead of investing in human capital expenditure such as 
children’s education or other productive investments.  Immediate and strong reactions are 
then necessary for these specific countries to limit the serious impact of climate change on 
them.    They  suffer  a  “double  penalty”  because,  in  the  current  context,  less-developed 
countries may be trapped in a vicious circle: their poverty makes them more vulnerable in the 
face  of  climate  change  and  due  to  their  poverty,  climate  change  will  have  serious 
consequences  on  health,  income  and  growth  prospects  and  will  trigger  their  poverty  and 
vulnerability.  In spite of this situation described previously, climate change is unfortunately 
considered as a long-term problem and future impacts of climate change do not have priority.  
Concerning this point, Ikeme (2003) analyzes the low capacity adaptation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries to cope with climate change effects.  Indeed, low adaptive capacity 
increases  vulnerability,  social  and  economic  costs  which  affect  human  capital  and  the 
development levels of these areas, which constitute transmission channels for migration.  For 
these countries, adaptation does not appear to be urgent issue and is underestimated by these 
most vulnerable countries.  Indeed, even if adaptation is globally recognized as a means to 
preventing and coping with the impacts of climate change, there is a relative indifference and 
insufficient measures in order to reinforce the capacity of adaptation.  Indeed, they are often 
in a difficult context with problems such as poverty, institutional weakness, low levels of 
education and skills or an inexistence of welfare systems; they are then obliged to act in 
emergency  in  case  of  climate  effects  (Washington  and  al.,  2006).    Moreover,  developing 
countries, particularly in SSA, consider the developed countries to be the major cause of 




2.2 How Climate change and natural disasters can affect migration? 
Migration  is  considered  as  a  possible  adaptive  response  to  risks  associated  with 
climate change (Mcleman and Smit, 2006).  Using Northern Ethiopia as an example, Meze-
Hausken  (2000)  shows  how  climate  change  triggers  migration  in  dryland  areas  of  less 
developed countries.  The impact of drought on migration depends on the intensity of the 
change, the vulnerability  of the individual who suffers the change  and the  availability  of 
survival  strategies.    The  intensity  of  the  climate  change  includes  damage  caused  by  the 
combination  of  natural,  socio-economic,  technological  and  perceived  conditions.    The 
vulnerability means an individual’s risk of exposure to the severe consequences of climatic 
disaster and the incapacity to cope with its consequences.  Survival strategies are actions 
taken to avert and to manage the climatic disaster after the event.  At the beginning of a 
drought, not all people are equally vulnerable in the face of the climatic change.  Families 
with more survival strategies manage to resist migration longer than those with fewer survival 
strategies.  But there comes a time after which survival strategies are reduced for all members 
of society at which point all people are affected in similar ways and are obliged to migrate.  
Migration  is  a  solution  to  the  failure  of  different  survival  strategies.    Nevertheless  it  is 
important to recognize that, in regions already with a high level of poverty and difficult living 
conditions, climatic change is a triggering factor of migration. 
Notwithstanding  this,  views  differ  on  whether  migration  could  be  considered  as 
adaptation.  Some characterize migration as a failure of, rather than as a form of, adaptation.  
Some operational organizations and academics point out the role that migration may play in 
helping home communities to adapt themselves, using the resources from migrant remittances 
(IOM,  2007;  Barnett  and  Jones,  2002).    Others  express  the  view  that  migration  is  a 
maladaptive response because the migration may trigger an increased risk for those who move 
and also possibly for areas towards which migrants move (Oliver-Smith, 2009).  Socially 
some factors including governance help determine whether people, threatened by rapid or 
slow onset environmental change, can remain in their homes or return once the threat has 
passed.  For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, out of the 1.5 million people 
displaced,  only  one-third  returned  and  governance  played  a  large  role  in  that  instance, 8 
 
underlining  the  need  to  understand  how  social  and  ecological  factors  interact  and  shape 
human mobility in the face of global environmental change (Warner, 2009).  
According  to  Naudé  (2008),  climate  change  affects  and  can  intensify  migration 
through three channels, namely scarcity of water and land, natural hazards, and conflicts over 
natural resources.  Indeed, migration towards new areas is often one of the main factors of 
environmental conflicts (Baechler, 1999b; Swain, 1993; Swain, 1996).  Climate change may 
cause tensions and conflicts in communities receiving migrants (Adger and Barnett, 2007).  
McGregor  (1994),  studying  the  link  between  environmental  change,  migration  and  food 
security,  shows  that  the  displacement  of  a  population  due  to  climate  change  can  induce 
conflicts linked to the food security of the hosting areas.  Food aid given to the refugees may 
destabilize food prices and the local production of the host economy, which in turn can cause 
malnutrition in refugee camps or weaken some regions already affected by food shortages. 
In general, the main channel leading to conflict is the way that climate change affects 
the  livelihood  of  host  populations  by  exerting  pressure  on  local  wages,  by  increasing 
competition for job opportunities, resulting in ethnic tension, mistrust, and friction and by 
affecting available resources, for instance by reducing access to land or to natural capital in 
general through deforestation. 
2.3 Some stylized facts 
Many stylized facts illustrate the relationship between climate change, natural disasters 
and  migration.    In  Chinese  ancient  history,  between  3550  and  2200  BC,  during  China’s 
Bronze Age, the settled Zhou tribes experienced conflicts with the nomadic Rong and Di 
tribes and were relocated five times.  Historians attributed these migrations only to political 
and  military  reasons  whereas  the  movement  of  populations  was  also  caused  by  climate 
change.  Those migrations were a means to protect agriculture by conserving resources in 
order  to  economize  food  production  threatened  by  drought  (Huang  and  Su,  2008).    The 
climatic  factor  also  influenced  Polynesian  migrations  between  300  and  1400  (Bridgman, 
1983). 
Similarly in Asia in 1975, as a method of increasing self-reliance and to provide food 
security to its population, India constructed the Farraka dam on the River Ganges permitting 
large-scale irrigation of state land.  But this project, by over-exploiting the river and diverting 
most of the Ganges’ dry-season water, and without consulting Bangladesh which shares the 9 
 
river,  induced  serious  ecological  and  political  consequences.    The  consequential 
environmental  degradation  affected  the  living  conditions  of  Bangladeshis  through  the 
destabilization of their ecosystem, the destruction of their essential sources of livelihood such 
as agriculture, industrial production and fishing.  The environmental destruction caused by the 
Indian dam firstly affected the rural ecosystem and then displaced the Bangladesh population 
towards urban areas.  But the low absorption capacity of Bangladesh cities made migration to 
India the only viable alternative.  Subsequently the environmentally-caused displacement of 
the Bangladeshi migrants constituted a burden for  Indian society, putting pressure on the 
availability of food and the labor market.  Since these migrants were Muslims yet the major 
proportion  of  the  receiving  country  was  Hindu,  problems  were  intensified  by  ethnic  and 
political  issues.    Tensions  between  migrants  and  natives  of  the  host  country  resulted  in 
regional conflict which then spread to other parts of India (Swain, 1996).  In Mali in the 1970s 
and 1980s, drought caused the migration of Tuareg people towards other countries.  When 
they returned to Mali they were marginalized by the competition between nomad and settled 
people, resulting in a rebellion in 1990 (Meier and Bond, 2007).  The El Niño events between 
the 1970s and 1990s caused extended droughts in Ethiopia.  They were followed by famine 
and political turmoil that resulted in radical changes of government, secession, and a massive 
program of population redistribution.  The consequences of government-imposed migration 
policies, whose catalyst was climate change caused by repeated El Niño events, were certain 
changes in the ethnic composition and the geographic pattern of population growth of certain 
Ethiopian regions (Comenetz and Caviedes, 2002).  Repeated droughts in the Senegal River 
basin triggered a conflict between Senegal and Mauritania which started when the river began 
to recede (Niasse, 2005).  In 1996-1997 a severe drought induced a mass migration from 
Kenya to Somalia and Ethiopia.  Because of a lack of adaptation and efficient measures, 
countries  such  as  Madagascar,  Zimbabwe  and  Kenya  viewed  their  economies  seriously 
affected respectively by droughts in 1992, floods in 1998, and cyclones in 2000.  Nigeria, 
Senegal  and  Angola  are  all  vulnerable  to  rises  in  sea  level  and  flooding  which  affected 
thousands of people (Ikeme, 2003; Benson and Clay, 1998; Ngecu and Mathu, 1999).  In 
2004, the tsunami in Indonesia displaced 500,000 people whereas Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
had serious consequences on human displacement with tens of thousands of migrants in 26 
states  of  the  USA.    Hurricane  Mitch,  like  Katrina,  had  a  devastating  effect  on  the  most 
vulnerable people and increased male migration from Honduras to Nicaragua (Smith, 2007). 
 10 
 
3.  Empirical design 
The empirical framework is developed in this section and, before presenting the data, the 
three main specifications showing the different relationships between natural disasters and 
migration are discussed. 
3.1 Methodology 
Firstly, the effect of natural disasters caused by climate change on net migration rates is 
estimated using the following specification: 
 
          (1) 
 
Where migi,t and disasteri,t are respectively the migration and natural disaster variables 
for the country i at the period t; Xk,i,t is the vector of control variables generally used in 
migration estimations;  µi represents the countries’ fixed effects and εi,t the error term.  The 
coefficient of natural disasters is expected to be positive. 
Secondly, the analysis is specified by taking migration rates according to the education 
levels.  We are interested in this point because we assume that natural disasters caused by 
climate change may affect the migration of people who are more educated or those who are 
more skilled.  Often they are those who get a job and a salary so they have the means to go 
abroad, to be safe, and to provide an insurance for their family back in the affected country.  
With respect to policy implications, they can induce a brain drain whose effects will be more 
serious in this context where countries need large support for rebuilding and have a special 
need for skilled workers.  We assume that this effect is higher for the most highly educated.  
So we have: 
        (2) 
Where   is the migration rate associated with each educational level j (j= 
low, medium and high educational levels). 
The two objectives already discussed are estimated by using country OLS fixed effects 
estimator  through  an  accurate  econometric  model.    However,  one  may  assume  some 
endogeneity issues caused by measurement errors of the variable of interest or by a potential 
simultaneity bias between migration and natural disasters.  But in our case we do not have 11 
 
these problems because we eliminate the measurement errors by using the CRED data which 
identifies the number of natural disasters each time such events arrive.  Secondly, we assume 
that migration at the period t cannot cause natural disasters at t or before t, but only in the 
future.  Since we estimate the effect of the number of natural disasters at the period t on the 
migration rate at the same period, we do not have a double causality issue.  
3.2 Data 
The objective of this paper is to assess the effect of natural disasters caused by climate 
change on global migration rates and on migration rates according to the level of education.  
This relationship is investigated by using panel data with countries as unit observations.  The 
dependent variables are the net migration rates between 1950 and 2010 made available by the 
United Nations Population Division and measured as the number of immigrants minus the 
number of emigrants over the period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of 
the receiving country over that period.  It is expressed as the net number of migrants per 1,000 
population.  However, we choose to use the opposite of this measure (the difference between 
the total number of emigrants minus the number of immigrants divided by the person-years 
lived by the population of the receiving country over that period) to be in conformity with the 
other migration indicators with regard to their sign: indeed, a higher level of these variables 
indicates a higher level of migration. 
We also use the Panel Data on International Migration of M. Schiff and M.C Sjöblom 
(2008) (World Bank Databases), which measures international migration from 1975 to 2000 
of the six main destination countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, UK and USA.  
They measure emigration rates through the stocks of migrants from sending countries to these 
countries for three educational levels, namely low, medium and high, divided by the stock of 
adults (+25) corresponding to the same educational level, in the country of origin plus the 
stock of migrants of sending countries.  We prefer this database to that produced by Docquier 
and Marfouk (2006); the latter uses the same measure but for all OECD countries in 1990 and 
2000, whereas the former has a larger temporal dimension and thus more observations.  
For the climate change indicators representing the variables of interest, we use the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) data (2010) from 1900 to 2010.  
Firstly  we  use  the  total  number  of  natural  disasters  in  a  country  in  a  five  year  period.  
Secondly we are interested in: meteorological disasters using a variable which considers the 
number of events caused by storms; hydrological disasters using a variable which groups 12 
 
together the number of events caused by floods and other wet mass movements; and drought, 
wildfire  and  climatological  disasters  through  a  variable  which  measures  the  number  of 
disasters caused by extremely high temperatures.  We are interested in these three measures 
because they are the natural disasters which are mainly caused by climate change.  
Other factors, such as the GDP per capita, the demographic pressure through variables 
such as young population and population density, the availability of arable land, the quality of 
the institutional situation in the country through political rights and civil war variables, can all 
influence migration and constitute the controls (see Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B 
for variables definition and sources, and summary statistics). 
4.  Results 
 
4.1 Natural disasters and net migration rates 
 
Estimations are made for poor and middle-to-lower income countries.  Table 1 shows the 
results of the effect of natural disasters on net migration rates.  Natural disasters are captured 
by four indicators expressed in logarithm: the total number of natural disasters (Column 1) 
and  its  desegregated  components,  namely  meteorological,  hydrological  and  climatological 
disasters (Column 2 to 4).  The number of natural disasters has a significant positive impact 
on net migration rates confirming previously documented results (Naudé, 2008; Reuveny and 
Moore, 2009).  This result is confirmed by the sub-components of natural disasters except for 
the  climatological  variable  which  becomes  significant  with  one  period  lag  (column  5).  
Moreover, if we introduce natural disasters and their disaggregated variables with one period 
lag (Table 2), it appears that all these variables are significant and positive.  In a word, natural 
disasters have a contemporaneous and lagged effect except for climatological events.  This is 
due to the fact that for storms, included in meteorological disasters, or floods and wet mass 
movements included in hydrological events, the mitigation and adaptation capabilities are less 
available for these types of events than for extreme temperatures events or droughts which are 
in the climatological category.  Indeed, during short term hydrological events, people have 
less choice to stay, whereas climatological events permit them time to prepare their migration 





4.2 The effect of the intensity of natural disasters on migration 
Even though the occurrence of natural disasters is a good measure, one could assume that 
the  intensity  is  more  relevant  in  assessing  the  relationship  between  climate  change  and 
migration.  Thus, to check the robustness of the previous results, we make our estimations by 
using,  for  each  sub-group  of  natural  disasters  (meteorological,  hydrological  and 
climatological variables), the costs representing total damages in US$; the number of deaths 
and the number of people injured, made homeless and otherwise affected.  Estimations in 
Table 3 confirm the previous results in Table 1 except for the number of deaths and the 
number of people affected by hydrological disasters which are not significant.  Indeed, the 
contemporaneous effect of the intensity variables of natural disasters on net migration exists 
for meteorological events, but only the damage caused by hydrological events increase net 
migration rates. 
4.3 The effect of natural disasters on migration according to the education level 
  The  effect  of  natural  disasters  on  migration  according  to  the  educational  level  is 
presented in Table 4.  The dependent variables are emigration rates with respectively low, 
medium and high educational levels.  The interest variable remains the number of natural 
disasters.  Only those individuals with a high level of education migrate in the case of an 
increased incidence in the number of natural disasters.  It means that natural disasters due to 
climate change heighten the brain drain phenomenon in developing countries just when they 
need the most skilled and qualified people to deal with the damage caused by natural disaster.  
 
4.4 Robustness check: the effect of natural disasters on highly educated migrants 
according to geographical location 
Even if natural disasters affect all countries, it is interesting to test if the behavior of 
highly educated people in the face of migration depends on the geographical location of the 
countries.  The dependent variable is the migration of highly educated populations and the 
variables of interest are the number of natural disasters and some interaction terms between 
the  number  of  natural  disasters  and  geographical  dummies
6.    We  find  in  Table  5  some 
differences  in  migration  behavior  in  Europe  and  Central  Asia  (ECA),  Latin  America  and 
Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asia (SA) regions.  The 
effect is positive for ECA, LAC and SA regions, where we observe increased migration rates 
                                                           
6 We do not run the estimations for each sub-region dummy because of their low sample size. 14 
 
of  highly  skilled  people  caused  by  natural  disasters.    For  ECA  and  LAC  regions,  the 
explanation may be that the receiving countries will be more tolerant in accepting them on 
account of their cultural and geographical proximity compared to other sending countries.  
For South Asia, the reason for this result may be due to the high frequency of natural disasters 
in this area and the low resilience of these countries.  In these two cases, migrants will be 
integrated  more  easily  in  the  job  market  of  the  receiving  countries  if  they  are  qualified.  
Despite  the  geographical  proximity  with  some  receiving  countries  there  is  a  negative 
relationship between the variable MENA and the migration variable.  However, if we observe 
the coefficient of the variable numbers of natural disasters, it appears that the effect is almost 
equal to 0.  Therefore it is very unlikely that highly skilled people from the MENA region 
migrate because of natural disasters.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks and Implications 
Climate change is one of the main challenges of the twenty-first century for all countries 
in the world in general, and in particular for developing countries which are more sensitive to 
its effects.  This paper assesses the relationship between natural disasters caused by climate 
change and migration by examining migration rates and levels of education.  Results, from a 
fixed effects estimator, show that natural disasters have a significant and positive effect on net 
migration rates.  But this effect is different according to the disaster type.  Climatological 
disasters have only a positive lagged effect of one period on migration, unlike the other types 
of disaster which have a contemporaneous and lagged positive impact on migration.  We also 
find that the effect is not the same for the different educational levels.  Natural disasters have 
an effect only on the migration of people with a high level of education.  Finally, we find 
some differences in migration behavior between highly educated people in European Central 
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle, East and North Africa and South Asia regions.  
 
Natural disasters due to climate change raise equity issues for developing countries by 
heightening the brain drain effect and by taking away qualifications and skills just when these 
countries are at their most vulnerable.  Developing countries have, of course, to make some 
efforts, but developed countries must provide more support and increase their political will to 
combat climate change and its damaging consequences above all in the poorest countries, for 
it is the latter, rather than more affluent countries, which contribute the least towards climate 
change and yet which suffer the greatest consequences. 15 
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Table 1: Fixed effects estimation of the Effect of natural disaster on international migration 
  Dependent variable: Net migration 
Indep. Var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Number of natural disasters  0.095
***         
  (3.20)         
Number of meteorological disasters    0.290
**       
    (2.37)       
Number of hydrological disasters      0.298
***     
      (2.85)     
Number of climatological disasters        -0.049   
        (0.10)   
Number of climatological disasters lag          1.378
** 
          (2.16) 
Log GDP per capita  -5.516
*  -5.497
*  -5.867
*  -4.715  -5.307
* 
  (1.70)  (1.68)  (1.79)  (1.38)  (1.66) 
Young population  -0.164  -0.166  -0.156  -0.243  -0.148 
  (0.59)  (0.61)  (0.56)  (0.90)  (0.55) 
Log Population Density  -2.229  -1.505  -2.391  -1.321  -2.126 
  (0.80)  (0.57)  (0.86)  (0.48)  (0.76) 
Percentage Arable area  -0.508  -0.509  -0.498  -0.504  -0.414 
  (0.90)  (0.89)  (0.89)  (0.87)  (0.73) 
Political rights  0.021  0.021  0.024  0.006  0.022 
  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.06) 






  (2.21)  (2.39)  (2.10)  (2.38)  (2.27) 
Constant  57.026  54.459  59.259  52.772  53.201 
  (1.52)  (1.47)  (1.56)  (1.38)  (1.45) 
Observations  435  435  435  435  435 
countries  88  88  88  88  88 
R²  0.063  0.065  0.067  0.057  0.076 
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 




















Table 2: Fixed effects estimation of the effect of lagged natural disaster on international migration 
  Dependent variable: Net migration 
Indep. Var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Number of Natural Disasters lag   0.110
**       
  (2.06)       
Number of meteorological disasters lag    0.175
**     
    (2.26)     
Number of hydrological disasters lag      0.257
*   
      (1.87)   
Number of climatological disasters lag        1.378
** 
        (2.16) 
Log GDP per capita  -5.575  -5.229  -5.494  -5.307
* 
  (1.65)  (1.59)  (1.63)  (1.66) 
Young population  -0.164  -0.202  -0.154  -0.148 
  (0.60)  (0.72)  (0.55)  (0.55) 
Log population density  -1.994  -1.467  -1.841  -2.126 
  (0.72)  (0.55)  (0.68)  (0.76) 
Percentage arable area  -0.491  -0.497  -0.502  -0.414 
  (0.87)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.73) 
Political rights  0.007  0.014  0.000  0.022 
  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.06) 





  (2.26)  (2.32)  (2.21)  (2.27) 
Constant  56.453  54.352  55.257  53.201 
  (1.48)  (1.44)  (1.46)  (1.45) 
Observations  435  435  435  435 
Countries  88  88  88  88 
R²  0.063  0.060  0.063  0.076 
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 







Table 3: Fixed effects estimation of the effect of natural disaster on international migration (other measures) 
  Dependent variable: Net migration 
Indep. Var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Log meteorological damages  0.221
***                 
  (2.88)                 
Log meteorological death    0.221
***               
    (2.88)               
Log meteorological total affected      0.407
***             
      (2.76)             
Log hydrological damages        0.187
**           
        (2.33)           
Log hydrological death          0.337         
          (1.48)         
Log hydrological total affected            -0.000       
            (0.00)       
Log climatological damages              0.029     
              (0.24)     
Log climatological death                0.017   
                (0.09)   
Log climatological total affected                  -0.040 
                  (0.56) 
Log GDP per capita  -4.740  -4.756  -4.756  -4.951  -4.890  -4.744  -4.969  -4.829  -4.903
* 
  (1.45)  (1.44)  (1.44)  (1.51)  (1.53)  (1.45)  (1.54)  (1.50)  (1.67) 
Young population  -0.224  -0.236  -0.261  -0.184  -0.230  -0.237  -0.172  -0.207  -0.144 
  (0.84)  (0.82)  (0.94)  (0.64)  (0.79)  (0.82)  (0.61)  (0.73)  (0.55) 
Log population density  -1.300  -1.354  -1.285  -1.797  -2.042  -1.340  -1.346  -1.747  -2.000 
  (0.50)  (0.52)  (0.48)  (0.66)  (0.86)  (0.59)  (0.52)  (0.67)  (0.77) 
Percentage arable area  -0.509  -0.503  -0.504  -0.521  -0.554  -0.503  -0.528  -0.506  -0.519 
  (0.89)  (0.88)  (0.89)  (0.92)  (0.94)  (0.86)  (0.93)  (0.89)  (0.92) 
Political rights  0.007  0.005  0.012  0.027  0.003  0.006  0.010  0.044  0.047 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.12) 










  (2.25)  (2.30)  (2.32)  (2.32)  (2.24)  (2.22)  (2.38)  (2.49)  (2.53) 
Constant  52.015  52.822  53.767  52.926  55.871  52.738  51.218  52.606  50.879 
  (1.43)  (1.38)  (1.42)  (1.39)  (1.52)  (1.43)  (1.37)  (1.41)  (1.47) 
Observations  435  435  435  435  435  435  435  435  435 
Countries  88  88  88  88  88  88  88  88  88 
R²  0.057  0.057  0.058  0.065  0.062  0.057  0.065  0.065  0.088 
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 23 
 
Table 4: Fixed effects estimation of the effect of natural disaster on international migration according 
to educational level 
  Dependent variable 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






       
Number of natural disasters  -0.00002  0.00007  0.001
** 
  (0.98)  (0.13)  (2.27) 




  (1.84)  (1.70)  (3.17) 
Young population  -0.001  -0.003  -0.001 
  (1.55)  (1.34)  (0.28) 
Population density  -0.001  -0.003  -0.024 
  (0.33)  (0.27)  (0.61) 
Percentage arable area  0.001  0.001  0.006
* 
  (0.88)  (0.65)  (1.70) 
Political rights  -0.001  -0.000  0.003 
  (1.64)  (0.20)  (0.83) 
Civil war  0.000  0.000  0.005 





  (1.67)  (1.71)  (2.31) 
Observations  435  435  435 
Countries  88  88  88 
R²  0.084  0.047  0.090 
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 

























Table 5: Fixed effects estimation of the effect of natural disaster on high educated migration rate 
according to geographical regions 
  Dependent variable: High educated migration rate 
Indep. Var.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Number of natural disasters  0.001
***  0.002  0.001
**  0.001
**  0.001
**  0.001 
  (2.97)  (1.46)  (2.25)  (2.09)  (2.42)  (1.58) 
(Disaster)x(SSA)  -0.002           
  (0.98)           
(Disaster)x(EAP)    -0.001         
    (0.67)         
(Disaster)x(ECA)      0.008
*       
      (1.84)       
(Disaster)x(LAC)        0.004
**     
        (2.51)     
(Disaster)x(MENA)          -0.003
**   
          (2.52)   
(Disaster)x(SA)            0.002
* 
            (1.73) 







  (3.52)  (2.98)  (3.12)  (2.89)  (3.32)  (3.41) 
Young population  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.05)  (0.35)  (0.21)  (0.08)  (0.44)  (0.45) 
Log population density  -0.015  -0.031  -0.023  -0.025  -0.023  -0.030 
  (0.32)  (0.66)  (0.58)  (0.64)  (0.57)  (0.74) 
Percentage arable area  0.006
*  0.006
*  0.006
*  0.005  0.006  0.007
** 
  (1.74)  (1.73)  (1.68)  (1.60)  (1.65)  (2.01) 
Political rights  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
  (0.85)  (0.85)  (0.86)  (0.95)  (0.87)  (0.86) 
Civil war  0.005  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.005  0.005 








  (2.11)  (2.28)  (2.22)  (2.14)  (2.43)  (2.49) 
Observations  435  435  435  435  435  435 
Countries  88.000  88.000  88.000  88.000  88.000  88.000 
R²  0.094  0.092  0.092  0.096  0.095  0.099 
Note: Absolute t statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 












Appendix A: Definitions 
A.1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007)) definition 
“Climate change in IPCC usage refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its 
properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to 
any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human 
activity. This usage differs from that in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), where climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere 
and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. 
 
A.2 Definitions of environmental migrants/ refugees 
El Hinnawi (1985): Environmental migrants are “people who have been forced to 
leave  their  traditional  habitat,  temporarily  or  permanently,  because  of  a  marked 
environmental disruption that jeopardized their existence or seriously affected the quality of 
their life”.  
Bates (2002) criticizes the definition and classification of environmental migration of 
El-Hinnawi in the UNEP 1985 report.  For Bates this definition does not provide generic 
criteria distinguishing environmental refugees from other types of migrants and not specify 
differences  between  types  of  environmental  refugees.    It  makes  no  distinction  between 
refugees  who  flee  volcanic  eruptions  and  those  who  gradually  leave  their  homes  as  soil 
quality declines.  For Bates “a working definition of environmental refugees includes people 
who  migrate  from  their  usual  residence  due  to  changes  in  their  ambient  non-human 
environment”.  This definition remains necessarily vague in order to incorporate the two most 
important features of environmental refugees: the transformation of the environment to one 
less suitable for human occupation and the acknowledgment that this causes migration.  The 
author  establishes  a  classification  of  environmental  refugees  according  to  the  causes  of 
migration.    One  distinguishes  three  categories  of  human  migration  due  to  environmental 
change: (i) Environmental refugees due to disasters caused by natural or technological events.  
Those  people  are  short-term  refugees  in  geographically  limited  areas.    Natural  disasters, 
which  include  hurricanes,  floods,  tornadoes,  earthquakes  or  events  that  made  a  place 
inhabitable  temporarily  or  permanently  are  considered,  alongside  technological  disasters 26 
 
resulting from human choices, as unintentional migration.  (ii) Environmental refugees due to 
expropriation of the environment are people who leave their habitat permanently to allow land 
use.  The expropriation of the environment can be due on one hand to economic development 
such as the construction of hydroelectric dams or roads and, on the other hand, to warfare and 
the  destruction  of  the  environment,  strategically  displacing  the  population  during  war 
incorporating, for instance, land mines.  (iii) Environmental refugees due to the deterioration 
of the environment: the migration of these people is caused by the anthropogenic degradation 
of their environment: one talks about environmental migrants.  The effect of environmental 
degradation ripples through the local economy context to affect migration.  While disasters 
and expropriation refugees do not possess any real means to control environmental change, 

















Appendix B: Tables 
Table B.1: Variables definition and sources 
Variables  Definition  Source 
Net migration 
 The  difference  between  the  total  number  of 
emigrants minus the number of immigrants divided 
by the person-years lived by the population  
 United Nations 
Population Division 
-Low educational migration rate  
-Medium educational migration 
rate 
-High educational migration rate 
 Stocks of migrants from sending countries to the  
6 key receiving countries in the OECD (Australia, 
Canada,  France,  Germany,  UK,  USA),  by 
educational  level,  divided  by  the  stock  of  adults 
(+25) corresponding to the same educational level, 
in the country of origin + The stock of migrants of 
sending countries  
M. Schiff and M.C 
Sjoblom (World Bank 
Databases) 
Number of natural disasters  Number  of  natural  disasters  (a  unique  disaster 
number for each event)   CRED 2010  
Number of meteorological 
disasters (storm) 
Number of events caused by small to meso scale 
atmospheric  processes  (in  the  spectrum  from 
minutes  to  days).    The  main  type  of  disaster  is 
storms. 
CRED 2010  
Number of hydrological disasters 
Number  of  events  caused  by  deviations  in  the 
normal water cycle and/or overflow of bodies of 
water caused by wind set-up.  The main types of 
disaster are flood and wet mass movement 
CRED 2010  
Number of climatological 
disasters 
Number of events caused by meso to macro scale 
processes (in the spectrum from intra-seasonal to 
multi-decadal climate variability).  The main type 
of disasters are extreme temperature, drought and 
wildfire 
CRED 2010 
Meteorological damages  Estimated damages due to meteorological disasters 
(given in US$)  CRED 2010  
Meteorological death 
Number of persons confirmed as dead and persons 
missing and presumed dead due to meteorological 
disasters 
CRED 2010 
Meteorological total affected  Sum  of  injured,  homeless  and  affected  due  to 
meteorological disasters  CRED 2010 
Hydrological damages  Estimated  damages  due  to  hydrological  disasters 
(given in US$)  CRED 2010 
Hydrological death 
Number of persons confirmed as dead and persons 
missing  and  presumed  dead  due  to  hydrological 
disasters 
CRED 2010 
Hydrological total affected  Sum  of  injured,  homeless  and  affected  due  to 
hydrological disasters  CRED 2010 
Climatological damages  Estimated damages due to climatological disasters 
(given in US$)  CRED 2010 
Climatological death 
Number of persons confirmed as dead and persons 
missing and presumed dead due to climatological 
disasters 
CRED 2010 
Climatological total affected  Sum  of  injured,  homeless  and  affected  due  to 
climatological disasters  CRED 2010 
GDP per capita  Gross Domestic Product per capita   Online World bank 
WDI 
Young population  Percentage of population under 14 years old   Online World bank 
WDI 




Table B.1 continued 
   
Variables  Definition  Source 
Percentage arable area  Arable area as percentage of total land area   Online World bank 
WDI 
Political rights 
Political  Rights  are  measured  on  a  one-to-seven 
scale, with one representing the highest degree of 
Freedom and seven the lowest. 
Freedom House 
Civil war 
 Dummy  variable  taking  the  value  1  for  a 
minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and 0 
otherwise.  
UCDP/PRIO Armed 

























Table B.2: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Stand. Dev.  Min  Max  N 
Net Migration  2.424828  8.771825  -57.1  53.4  435 
Low education migration rate  0.012835  0.0283228  0.0000242  0.208263  435 
Medium education migration rate  0.0455184  0.093226  0.0000273  0.5790774  435 
High education migration rate  0.1780199  0.2031705  0.0003033  1  435 
Number of natural disasters  7.151724  12.76552  0  109  435 
Number of meteorological disasters  1.641379  5.11212  0  37  435 
Number of hydrological disasters  2.503448  4.868488  0  40  435 
Number of climatological disasters  0.8206897  1.223817  0  9  435 
Meteorological damages  20974.55  179698.8  0  2890000  435 
Meteorological death  59.75172  736.3724  0  15100  435 
Meteorological total affected  119573.9  697670.5  0  6570000  435 
Hydrological damages  35994.96  337246.4  0  6720000  435 
Hydrological death  70.89655  396.3844  0  6303  435 
Hydrological total affected  926199.7  7417160  0  1.27e+08  435 
Climatological damages  5422.067  49858.3  0  796000  435 
Climatological death  4.795402  37.9428  0  558  435 
Climatological total affected  247293.4  2634030  0  5.00e+07  435 
GDP per capita  658.9108  518.9644  56.46796  3329.864  435 
Young population  42.69585  5.192969  17.5106  51.771  435 
Population density  82.26051  128.1624  1.21864  1071.171  435 
Percentage arable area  13.74876  13.40381  0.0431406  70.19283  435 
Political rights  4.88046  1.790775  1  7  435 








Table B.3: Country list 
Albania     Guinea     Papua New Guinea 
Angola  Guinea-Bissau  Paraguay    
Armenia  Guyana  Philippines    
Azerbaijan  Haiti  Rwanda    
Bangladesh  Honduras  Samoa    
Belize  India  Senegal    
Benin  Indonesia  Sierra Leone 
Bhutan 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
  Solomon Islands 
Bolivia  Jordan  Sri Lanka    
Burkina Faso  Kenya  Sudan    
Burundi  Kyrgyz Republic  Swaziland    
Cambodia  Lao PDR  Syrian Arab Republic 
Cameroon  Lesotho  Tajikistan    
Cape Verde  Liberia  Tanzania    
Central African 
Republic  Madagascar  Thailand    
Chad  Malawi  Timor-Leste    
China  Maldives  Togo    
Comoros  Mali  Tonga    
Congo, Rep.  Mauritania  Tunisia    
Cote d»Ivoire 
Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts.  Turkmenistan 
Ecuador  Moldova  Uganda    
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Mongolia  Ukraine    
El Salvador  Morocco  Uzbekistan    
Eritrea  Nepal  Vanuatu    
Ethiopia  Nicaragua  Vietnam    
Gambia, The  Niger  Yemen, Rep. 
Georgia  Nigeria  Zambia    
Ghana  Pakistan  Zimbabwe    
Guatemala                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 